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Abstract. A barrier certificate is an inductive invariant function which
can be used for the safety verification of a hybrid system. Safety veri-
fication based on barrier certificate has the benefit of avoiding explicit
computation of the exact reachable set which is usually intractable for
nonlinear hybrid systems. In this paper, we propose a new barrier cer-
tificate condition, called Exponential Condition, for the safety verifica-
tion of semi-algebraic hybrid systems. The most important benefit of
Exponential Condition is that it has a lower conservativeness than the
existing convex condition and meanwhile it possesses the property of
convexity. On the one hand, a less conservative barrier certificate forms
a tighter over-approximation for the reachable set and hence is able to
verify critical safety properties. On the other hand, the property of con-
vexity guarantees its solvability by semidefinite programming method.
Some examples are presented to illustrate the effectiveness and practi-
cality of our method.
Keywords: inductive invariant, barrier certificate, safety verification,
hybrid system, nonlinear system, sum of squares
1 Introduction
Hybrid systems [5], [1] are models for those systems with interacting discrete and
continuous dynamics. Embedded systems are often modeled as hybrid systems
due to their involvement of both digital control software and analog plants.
In recent years, as embedded systems are becoming ubiquitous, more and more
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researchers are devoted to the theory of hybrid systems. Reachability problems or
safety verification problems are among the most challenging problems in verifying
hybrid systems. The aim of safety verification is to decide that starting from an
initial set, whether a continuous system or hybrid system can reach an unsafe set.
For this purpose, many methods have been proposed for various hybrid systems
with different features.
Deductive methods based on inductive invariant play an important role in
safety verification of hybrid systems. An inductive invariant of a hybrid system is
an invariant ϕ that holds at the initial states of the system, and is preserved by
all discrete and continuous transitions. A safety property is an invariant ψ (usu-
ally not inductive) that holds in all reachable states of the system. The standard
technique for proving a given property ψ is to generate an inductive invariant ϕ
that implies ψ. Therefore, the problem of safety verification is converted to the
problem of inductive invariant generation and hence avoid the reachability com-
putation of the hybrid system. The key points in generating inductive invariant
for hybrid systems is how to define an inductive condition that is the least con-
servative and how to efficiently compute the inductive invariant that satisfies the
inductive condition. Usually, these two aspects contradicts with each other, that
is, an inductive condition with sufficiently low conservativeness often encounters
the computability or complexity problem. For different class of hybrid systems,
various inductive invariants and computational methods have been proposed.
Some methods were primarily proposed for constructing inductive invariant
for linear hybrid systems [6], [16]. In recent years, however, researchers concen-
trate more and more on nonlinear hybrid systems, especially on algebraic or
semi-algebraic hybrid systems (i.e. those systems whose vector fields are poly-
nomials and whose set descriptions are polynomial equalities or inequalities),
as they have a higher universality. In [18], [17], Sankaranarayanan et al. pre-
sented a computational method based on the theory of ideal over polynomial
ring and quantifier elimination for automatically generating algebraic invariants
for algebraic hybrid systems. Similarly, Tiwari et al. proposed in [23] a technique
based on the theory of ideal over polynomial ring to generate the inductive in-
variant for nonlinear polynomial systems. In [14], [13], S. Prajna et al. proposed
a new inductive invariant called Barrier Certificate for verifying the safety of
semialgebraic hybrid systems and the computational method they applied is the
technique of sum-of-squares decomposition of semidefinite polynomials. In [19],
C. Sloth et al. proposed a new Barrier Certificate for a special class of hybrid
systems which can be modeled as an interconnection of subsystems. In [12], A.
Platzer et al. proposed the concept of Differential Invariant which is a boolean
combination of multiple polynomial inequalities for verifying semialgebraic hy-
brid systems. In [4], S. Gulwani et al. proposed an inductive invariant similar
to Differential Invariant except that they defined a different inductive condition
and they used SMT solver to solve the inductive invariant. In [22], A. Taly et al.
discussed the soundness and completeness of several existing invariant condition
and presented several simpler and practical invariant condition that are sound
and relatively complete for different classes of inductive invariants. In [21], A.
Taly et al. proposed to use inductive controlled invariant to synthesize multi-
modal continuous dynamical systems satisfying a specified safety property.
In this paper, we propose a new barrier certificate (called Exponential Con-
dition) for the safety verification of semialgebraic hybrid systems. A barrier
certificate is a special class of inductive invariant for the safety verification of
hybrid systems: a function ϕ(x) which maps all the states in the reachable set
to non-positive reals and all the states in the unsafe set to positive reals. Given
a dynamical system S with dynamics x˙ = f(x) with initial set Init, to prove
a safety property P (we use Xu to denote the unsafe set) is satisfied by S, the
basic idea of Exponential Condition is to identify a function ϕ(x) such that 1)
ϕ(x) ≤ 0 for any point x ∈ Init, 2) ϕ(x) > 0 for any point x ∈ Xu, and 3)
Lfϕ(x) ≤ λϕ(x), where Lfϕ(x) = ∂ϕ∂x f(x) is the Lie derivative of ϕ with respect
to the vector field f and λ is any negative constant real value. The first con-
dition and the third condition together guarantee that ϕ(x) ≤ 0 for any point
x in the reachable set R, which implies that R ∩ Xu = ∅. Therefore, we can
assert that the safety property P is satisfied by the system M as long as we
can find a function ϕ(x) satisfying the above condition. The above condition can
be extended to semialgebraic hybrid systems naturally. The idea is to identify
a set of functions {ϕi(x)}, one for each mode of the hybrid system, which not
only satisfy the above condition but also satisfy an additional sign-preserving
constraint for each discrete transition.
The most important benefit of Exponential Condition is that it is less conser-
vative than Convex Condition [14] and Differential Invariant [12], where the Lie
derivative of ϕ(x) is required to satisfy that Lfϕ(x) ≤ 0 (a stronger condition
than Lfϕ(x) ≤ λϕ(x)), and meanwhile, it possesses the property of convex-
ity as well. On the one hand, a less conservative inductive invariant forms a
tighter over-approximation for the reachable set and hence is able to verify criti-
cal safety properties (i.e., the unsafe region is very close to reachable region). On
the other hand, a convex inductive invariant condition can be solved efficiently
by semidefinite programming method, which is widely used for computing Lya-
punov functions in the stability analysis of nonlinear systems. In fact, there
exist some other less conservative inductive invariants than Exponential Condi-
tion, such as [14], [4], [22], however, these inductive conditions are not convex
and thus cannot be solved by semidefinite programming method. Instead, they
are usually solved by quantifier elimination and SMT solver, which usually has a
much higher computational complexity than semidefinite programming method.
Given a semialgebraic hybrid system, we choose a set of polynomials of
bounded degree with unknown coefficients as the candidate inductive invariant,
and then we obtain a set of positive semidefinite polynomials (i.e. P (x) ≥ 0) ac-
cording to Exponential Condition. Therefore, the generation of barrier certificate
based on Exponential Condition can be transformed to the problem of sum-of-
squares programming of positive semidefinite polynomials [20], [15]. Based on
our theory, we develop an algorithm for generating the inductive invariant satis-
fying Exponential Condition. Experiments on both nonlinear systems and hybrid
systems show the effectiveness and practicality of our method.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
preliminaries of our method. Section 3 presents the barrier certificate conditions
for continuous systems and hybrid systems. Section 4 introduces the computa-
tional method we use to construct barrier certificates according to the barrier
certificate conditions. Section 5 gives some examples to demonstrate the appli-
cation of our method to the safety verification of continuous and hybrid systems.
Finally, we conclude our work in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we adopt the model proposed in [3] as our modeling framework.
Many other models for hybrid system can be found in [10], [9], [1].
A continuous system is specified by a differential equation
x˙ = f(x) (1)
where x ∈ Rn and f is a Lipschitz continuous vector function from Rn to Rn.
Note that the Lipschitz continuity guarantees the existence and uniqueness of
the solution x(t) to the system (1). A hybrid system can then be defined as:
Definition 1. (Hybrid System) A hybrid system is a tuple H = 〈L,X,E,R,G,
I, F 〉, where
– L is a finite set of locations (or modes);
– X ⊆ Rn is the continuous state space. The hybrid state space of the system
is denoted by X = L×X and a state is denoted by (l, x) ∈ X ;
– E ⊆ L× L is a set of discrete transitions;
– G : E 7→ 2X is a guard mapping over discrete transitions;
– R : E ×X 7→ 2X is a reset mapping over discrete transitions;
– I : L 7→ 2X is an invariant mapping;
– F : L 7→ (X 7→ X) is a vector field mapping which assigns to each location l
a vector field f .
The transition and dynamic structure of the hybrid system defines a set of
trajectories. A trajectory is a sequence starting from a state (l0, x0) ∈ X0, where
X0 ⊆ X is an initial set, and consisting of a series of interleaved continuous
flows and discrete transitions. During the continuous flows, the system evolves
following the vector field F (l) at some location l ∈ L until the invariant condition
I(l) is violated. At some state (l, x), if there is a discrete transition (l, l′) ∈ E such
that (l, x) ∈ G(l, l′) (we write G(l, l′) for G((l, l′))), then the discrete transition
can be taken and the system state can be reset to R(l, l′, x). The problem of
safety verification of a hybrid system is to prove that the hybrid system cannot
reach an unsafe set Xu from an initial set X0.
An important concept used in this paper is the Lie derivative. In our context,
the Lie derivative evaluates the change of a scalar function ϕ(x) along the flow
of a vector field f(x) = (f1(x), · · · , fn(x)). Formally,
Lfϕ , ∂ϕ
∂x
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
∂ϕ
∂xi
fi(x)
Some other notations that are used in this paper are presented here. R de-
notes the real number field. C1(Rn) denotes the space of 1-time continuously
differentiable functions mapping X ⊆ Rn to R. R[x] denotes the polynomial ring
in x over the real number field and R[x]m denotes the m-dimensional polynomial
vector space over R[x]. MT denotes the transpose of the matrix M .
3 Conditions for Constructing Barrier Certificates
3.1 Barrier Certificate Condition for Continuous Systems
Given a continuous system S, an initial set X0 and an unsafe set Xu, a barrier
certificate is a real-valued function ϕ(x) of states satisfying that ϕ(x) ≤ 0 for any
point x in the reachable set R and ϕ(x) > 0 for any point x in the unsafe set Xu
(called General Constraint hereafter). Therefore, if there exists such a function
ϕ(x), we can assert that R ∩Xu = ∅, that is, the system can not reach a state
in the unsafe set from the initial set. However, the exact reachable set R is not
computable for most hybrid systems, we cannot decide directly whether ϕ(x) ≤ 0
holds for all the points in R. Therefore, various alternative inductive conditions
that are equivalent to or sufficient for General Constraint are proposed. In what
follows, we present a new barrier certificate which is a sufficient condition for
General Constraint.
Consider a continuous system C specified by the differential equation (1), we
assume that X0(⊆ X), Xu are the initial set and the unsafe set respectively.
Then, we have the following theorem as a barrier certificate condition.
Theorem 1 (Exponential Condition). Given the continuous system (1) and
the corresponding sets X, X0 and Xu, for any given λ ∈ R, if there exists
a barrier certificate, i.e, a real-valued function ϕ(x) ∈ C1(Rn) satisfying the
following formulae:
∀x ∈ X0 : ϕ(x) ≤ 0 (2)
∀x ∈ X : Lfϕ(x)− λϕ(x) ≤ 0 (3)
∀x ∈ Xu : ϕ(x) > 0 (4)
then the safety property is satisfied by the system (1).
Proof. Suppose x0 ∈ X0 and x(t) be the corresponding particular solution of
the system (1). We aim to prove that for any function ϕ(x(t)) satisfying the
formulae (2)–(4), the following formula holds:
∀ζ ≥ 0 : ϕ(x(ζ)) ≤ 0. (5)
Let g(x) = Lfϕ(x)− λϕ(x), then by (3)
∀x ∈ X : g(x) ≤ 0 (6)
Since dϕ(x(t))dt =
∂ϕ
∂x
dx
dt =
∂ϕ
∂x f(x) = Lfϕ(x), we have the differential equation
about ϕ(x(t)) {
dϕ(x(t))
dt − λϕ(x(t))− g(x(t)) = 0
ϕ(x(0)) = ϕ(x0)
(7)
By solving the differential equation (7), we have following the solution:
ϕ(x(t)) = (
∫ t
0
(g(x(τ))e−λτdτ + ϕ(x0))eλt. (8)
By (6), we have ∫ t
0
(g(x(τ))e−λτdτ ≤ 0. (9)
then by (9) and ϕ(x0) ≤ 0, we finally have
ϕ(x(t)) ≤ ϕ(x0)eλt ≤ 0. (10)
Hence, for any ζ ≥ 0, ϕ(x(ζ)) ≤ 0 holds. uunionsq
Remark 1. The formulae (2) and (4) ensure that the barrier separates the initial
set X0 from the unsafe set Xu, and the formula (3) ensures that system trajec-
tories cannot escape from inside of the barrier. These conditions together imply
that ϕ(x) ≤ 0 is an inductive invariant of the system (1).
From another point of view, the semi-algebraic set {x ∈ Rn|ϕ(x) ≤ 0} forms
an over-approximation for the reachable set of the system (1), and the zero level
set of the function ϕ(x) (i.e., {x ∈ Rn|ϕ(x) = 0}) forms the boundary of the
over-approximation. In order to be less conservative, we hope the boundary of
the over-approximation encloses the reachable set {x(t)|x(0) ∈ X0, x˙ = f(x), t ∈
R+} as tightly as possible, in other words, to make the upper-bound of ϕ(x(t))
approach zero as closely as possible. According to the above proof (i.e., (10)), the
scope over which the function ϕ(x(t)) can range depends closely on the value of
the parameter λ: the less value the λ is, the closer the upper-bound of the scope
that ϕ(x(t)) can reach is to zero (see Fig. 1). Roughly speaking, the values of
λ are divided into three classes according to the conservativeness of the barrier
certificate condition:
– λ = 0. In this case, the formula (3) is degenerated to ∂ϕ∂x f(x) ≤ 0, which
is the case of Convex Condition. This condition implies that the value of
ϕ(x(t)) will never get close to zero over time t. Thus, the condition is very
conservative.
– λ < 0. In this case, we know that 1) ϕ(x(t)) ≤ ϕ(x0)eλt ≤ 0, and 2) ∂ϕ∂x f(x) ≤
λϕ(x) ≥ 0. These two inequalities together imply that the value of ϕ(x(t))
can increase over the time t but never get across the upper bound 0, provided
that ϕ(x(0)) ≤ 0 at the beginning.
– λ > 0. In this case, ∂ϕ∂x f(x) ≤ λϕ(x) ≤ 0, which means that the value
of ϕ(x(t)) get far away from 0. Apparently, the condition is much more
conservative than the first case.
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Fig. 1. Dependency of Barrier Certificate Condition on λ. As the value of λ decreases
(e.g. from 1/4 to −3), the upper-bound of the value of ϕ(x(t)) approaches to zero,
which means the barrier certificate condition becomes less conservative
Therefore, as long as we let λ < 0, we can get less conservative barrier certificate
conditions than Convex Condition. Note that Exponential Condition is convex as
well and its convexity can be easily proved by verifying that for any two functions
ϕ1(x) and ϕ2(x) satisfying the formulae (2)–(4) and any θ with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1,
ϕ(x) = θϕ1(x) + (1 − θ)ϕ2(x) satisfies the formulae (2)–(4) as well. Based on
this fact, we can convert the problem of constructing barrier certificate into the
problem of convex optimization which we will discuss in Section 4.
In addition, as a generalization of Convex Condition, Differential Invariant
is basically as conservative as Convex Condition. Here we present informally an
explanation on this point. The differences in their definitions include mainly two
aspects:
1. invariant template: Convex Condition employs a single inequality p(x) ≤ 0
as the invariant template while Differential Invariant employs a conjunction∧m
i=1 qi(x)i ri(x), where i denotes a connective in {=,≥, >,≤, <}.
2. inductive condition: Convex Condition employs Lf (p) ≤ 0 as the inductive
condition while Differential Invariant employs the conjunction
∧m
i=1 Lfqii
Lfri, which results from applying the Lie derivative to each of the conjuncts
in the invariant template respectively.
Note that each conjunct of a Differential Invariant is still an inductive invariant
by itself, which is named Sub-Differential-Invariant here. Based on the above def-
inition, we can easily prove that every Sub-Differential-Invariant qi(x) i ri(x)
satisfies Convex Condition. For example, suppose we have a Sub-Differential-
Invariant qi(x) > ri(x) and the corresponding inductive condition Lfqi > Lfri,
let p(x) = ri(x) − qi(x), then we can obtain an equivalent inductive invariant
p(x) < 0 and the corresponding inductive condition Lfp = Lfqi − Lfri < 0,
which implies p(x) ≤ 0 and Lfp ≤ 0 hold. Therefore, the Sub-Differential-
Invariant qi(x) > ri(x) satisfies Convex Condition. Similarly, all the other
cases of qi(x) i ri(x) can be proved to satisfy Convex Condition. Hence, Sub-
Differential-Invariant is no less conservative than Convex Condition. By taking
a conjunction of multiple Sub-Differential Invariants, Differential Invariant ac-
tually enhances the ability to over-approximate complex-shaped reachable sets.
However, this does not overcome the drawback that no trajectory of the sys-
tem can move towards the boundary of the over-approximation formed by a
Differential Invariant. Therefore, in this sense, we say that Differential Invari-
ant is basically as conservative as Convex Condition and consequently is more
conservative than Exponential Condition.
In the following subsection, we extend the barrier certificate condition for
continuous systems to hybrid systems.
3.2 Barrier Certificate Condition for Hybrid Systems
Different from the barrier certificate for a continuous system, the barrier cer-
tificate for a hybrid system consists of a set of functions {ϕl(x)|l ∈ L}, each
of which corresponds to a discrete location of the system and forms a barrier
between the reachable set and the unsafe set at that individual location. For
each function ϕl(x) at location l, in addition to defining constraints for the con-
tinuous flows, the barrier certificate conditions have to take into account all the
discrete transitions starting from location l to make the overall barrier certificate
an inductive invariant. Formally, we define the barrier certificate condition for
hybrid systems as the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Hybrid-Exp Condition). Given the hybrid system H = 〈L,X,
E,R,G, I, F 〉, the initial set X0 and the unsafe set Xu of H, then, for any given
set of constant real numbers Sλ = {λl ∈ R|l ∈ L} and any given set of constant
non-negative real numbers Sγ = {γll′ ∈ R+|(l, l′) ∈ E}, if there exists a set of
functions {ϕl(x)|ϕl(x) ∈ C1(Rn), l ∈ L} such that, for all l ∈ L and (l, l′) ∈ E,
the following conditions hold:
∀x ∈ Init(l) : ϕl(x) ≤ 0 (11)
∀x ∈ I(l) : Lflϕl(x)− λlϕl(x) ≤ 0 (12)
∀x ∈ G(l, l′),∀x′ ∈ R((l, l′), x) : γll′ϕl(x)− ϕl′(x′) ≥ 0 (13)
∀x ∈ Unsafe(l) : ϕl(x) > 0 (14)
where Init(l) and Unsafe(l) denote respectively the initial set and the unsafe
set at location l, then the safety property is satisfied by H.
Proof. To prove this theorem, it is sufficient to prove that given any trajectory,
say pi, of the system H, it cannot reach an unsafe state. Suppose the infinite time
interval R+ associated with pi is divided into an infinite sequence of continuous
time subintervals, i.e., R+ =
⋃∞
n=0 In, where In = {t ∈ R+|tn ≤ t ≤ tn+1} is
the time interval that the system spent at location ρ(In) (where ρ(In) returns
the location corresponding to In), we define the trajectory as pi = {xρ(In)(t)|t ∈
In, n ∈ N}, where xρ(I0)(t0) ∈ Init(ρ(I0)). Then, our objective is to prove the
following assertion:
∀n ∈ N : ∀t ∈ In : ϕρ(In)(xρ(In)(t)) ≤ 0. (15)
The basic proof idea is by induction.
Basis: n = 0. According to Theorem 1, it’s obvious that
∀t ∈ I0 : ϕρ(I0)(xρ(I0)(t)) ≤ 0
Induction: n = k. Assume for some k,
∀n ∈ [0, k] : ∀t ∈ In : ϕρ(In)(xρ(In)(t)) ≤ 0
we mean to prove that
∀t ∈ Ik+1 : ϕρ(Ik+1)(xρ(Ik+1)(t)) ≤ 0
Case 1. (Discrete Transition) By the inductive assumption, we know that
∀t ∈ Ik : ϕρ(Ik)(xρ(Ik)(t)) ≤ 0
hence
∀t ∈ Ik : x(t) ∈ G(ρ(Ik), ρ(Ik+1)) =⇒ ϕρ(Ik)(x(t)) ≤ 0
According to condition (13), we know that ϕρ(Ik+1)(xρ(Ik+1)(tk+1)) ≤ 0.
Case 2. (Continuous Transition) According to Case 1 and condition (12), we
can conclude that ∀t ∈ Ik+1 : ϕρ(Ik+1)(xρ(Ik+1)(t)) ≤ 0 by Theorem 1.
By induction, we know that the assertion (15) holds. Therefore, the safety
property is guaranteed. uunionsq
Informally, the formulae (11), (12) and (14) together ensure that at each
location l ∈ L, the system never evolves into an unsafe state continuously. The
formula (13) ensures that the system never jumps from a safe state to an unsafe
state discretely. By induction, the formulae (11)–(14) together guarantee the
safety of the system.
Remark 2. The selection of the parameter set Sλ is essential to the conserva-
tiveness of the barrier certificate conditions. As discussed in Subsection 3.1, by
setting all the elements of Sλ to 0, we can derive Convex Condition for hybrid
systems. However, Convex Condition is too restrictive to be useful for hybrid
systems. For example, see the hybrid system in Fig. 2, there is a reset operation
x = xr (which is often the case) at the transition (l2, l1). Assume there exists a
barrier certificate {ϕl1(x), ϕl2(x)} if we set all the elements of Sλ to 0 and (with-
out loss of generality) set all the elements of Sγ to 1, then for any trajectory
containing at least two times of the transition (l2, l1), one at time instant t1 and
another at t2, t1 < t2, respectively, we can assert that ϕl1(xl1t1) > ϕl1(xl1t2)
1( )x f x= 2 ( )x f x=
21 : rGuard x x® =
12 12Guard Reset®
1Inv 2Inv
1l 2l
. .
Fig. 2. A hybrid system without barrier certificate satisfying Convex Condition.
according to Theorem 2, this contradicts with xl1t1 = xl1t2 = xr, that is, the
barrier certificate satisfying Convex Condition does not exist no matter what
the unsafe set is. Therefore, in order to make the barrier certificate condition
less conservative, we try to choose negative values for λl ∈ Sλ and theoretically:
the less, the better. However, in practice, the optimal domain for λ may depend
on the specific computational method. For example, the interval [−1, 0) appears
to be optimal and not too sensitive in-between for the semidefinite programming
method used in this paper.
The selection of Sγ is relatively simple. We usually set all of its elements to
1 except for the discrete jumps with a reset operation that is independent of the
pre-state of the jump, for which we usually set γll′ to 0.
4 Construction Method for Barrier Certificate
Constructing inductive invariants for general hybrid systems is very hard. For-
tunately, for some existing inductive conditions, several computational methods
are available for semialgebraic hybrid systems. The most representative methods
include the fixed-point method based on saturation [12], the constraint-solving
methods based on semidefinite programming [13] and quantifier elimination [4]
and the Grobner-bases method [23], [17]. Similar to Convex Condition, Expo-
nential Condition defines a convex set of barrier certificate functions as well and
hence can be solved by semidefinite programming method supposing the hybrid
system is semialgebraic and the barrier certificate function ϕ(x) is a polynomial.
In our computational method, a barrier certificate is assumed to be a set
Φ = {ϕl(x)|l ∈ L} of multivariate polynomials of fixed degrees with a set of
unknown real coefficients. According to the constraint inequalities in Theorem 1
or Theorem 2, we can obtain a set of positive semidefinite (PSD) polynomials
Q = {Qi|Qi(x) ≥ 0, deg(Qi) = 2n, x ∈ Rn, n ∈ N}, where deg(·) returns the
degree of a polynomial. Note that a polynomial Q(x) of degree 2k is said to be
PSD if and only if Q(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn. Thus, our objective is to find a set
of real-valued coefficients for ϕl ∈ Φ to make all the Qi ∈ Q be PSD.
A famous sufficient condition for a polynomial P (x) of degree 2k to be PSD
is that it is a sum-of-squares (SOS ) P (x) =
∑
qi(x)
2 for some polynomials qi(x)
of degree k or less [8]. Furthermore, it is equivalent to that P (x) has a positive
semidefinite quadratic form, i.e., P (x) = v(x)Mv(x)T , where v(x) is a vector
of monomials with respect to x of degree k or less and M is a real symmetric
PSD matrix with the coefficients of P (x) as its entries. Therefore, the problem
of finding a PSD polynomial P (x) can be converted to the problem of solving a
linear matrix inequality (LMI) M  0 [2], which can be solved by semidefinite
programming [11].
In our work, we extend SOSTOOLS based on the theory in this paper to
implement an algorithm for discovering barrier certificate automatically.
4.1 Sum-of-squares Transformation for Continuous System
In order to be solvable for the barrier certificate condition by SOS programming,
we need to restate it with multivariate polynomials. In this context, we assume
that all the state sets involved in the condition are semialgebraic, that is, they can
be written as {x ∈ Rn|P1(x) ≥ 0, ..., Pm(x) ≥ 0, Pi(x) ∈ R[x], 1 ≤ i ≤ m}). For
convenience, we write it compactly as {x ∈ Rn|P(x) ≥ 0,P(x) ∈ R[x]m}, where
P(x) = (P1(x), P2(x), ..., Pm(x)). In addition, each dimension of the vector field
f(x) and the barrier certificate function ϕ(x) are all polynomials in R[x]. Based
on the previous assumption, we present the sum-of-squares transformation of
Exponential Condition for continuous systems as the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Given the continuous polynomial system (1) and the initial set
X0 = {x ∈ Rn|I0(x) ≥ 0, I0(x) ∈ R[x]r} and the unsafe set Xu = {x ∈
Rn|U(x) ≥ 0, U(x) ∈ R[x]s}, where r and s are the dimensions of the poly-
nomial vector spaces, for any λ ∈ R and any real number  > 0, if there exists
a polynomial function ϕ(x) ∈ R[x] and two SOS polynomial vectors (i.e., ev-
ery element of the vector is a SOS polynomial) µ(x) ∈ R[x]r and η(x) ∈ R[x]s
satisfying that the following polynomials
− ϕ(x)− µ(x)I0(x) (16)
− Lfϕ(x) + λϕ(x) (17)
ϕ(x)− η(x)U(x)−  (18)
are all SOSs, then the safety property is satisfied by the system (1).
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that any ϕ(x) satisfying (16)–(18) also satisfies
(2)–(4). By (16), we have −ϕ(x) − µ(x)I0(x) ≥ 0, that is, ϕ(x) ≤ −µ(x)I0(x).
Because for any x ∈ X0, −µ(x)I0(x) ≤ 0, this means ϕ(x) ≤ 0. Similarly, we
can derive (3) from (17). By (18), it’s easy to prove that ϕ(x)−  ≥ 0 holds for
any x ∈ Xu. Since  is greater than 0, then the condition (4) holds. Therefore,
the system (1) is safe. uunionsq
Remark 3. Since the polynomials (16)–(18) are required to be SOS s, each of
them can be transformed to a positive semidefinite quadratic form v(x)Miv(x)T ,
whereMi is a real symmetric PSD matrix with the coefficients of ϕ(x), µ(x) and
η(x) as its variables. As a result, we obtain a set of LMI s {Mi  0} which can
be solved by semidefinite programming.
Algorithm 1: Computing Barrier Certificate for Continuous System
Input: f : array of polynomial vector field; I0: array of polynomials defining X0;
U : array of polynomials defining Xu
Output: ϕ: barrier certificate polynomial
Variables : λ: a real negative value; d: degree of ϕ
Constants: Λ: array of candidate values for λ; : a positive value; dMin,
dMax: the minimal degree and maximal degree of ϕ to be found
1 Initialize. Set Λ to a set of negative values between −1 and 0; Set  to a small
positive value; Set dMin and dMax to positive integer respectively;
2 Pick λ and d. For each λ ∈ Λ and for each d from dMin to dMax, perform step
3–7 until a barrier certificate is found;
3 Decide the degree of µ(x) and η(x) according to d. To be SOSs for both (16)
and (18), at least one of the degrees of µ(x)I0(x) and η(x)U(x) is greater than
or equal to the degree of ϕ(x);
4 Generate complete polynomials ϕ(x), µ(x) and η(x) of specified degree with
unknown coefficient variables;
5 Eliminate the monomials of odd top degrees in (16)–(18), µ(x) and η(x),
respectively. To be a SOS, a polynomial has to be of even degree. Concretely, let
the coefficients of the monomials to be eliminated be zero to get equations
about coefficient variables and then reduce the number of coefficient variables
by solving the equations and substituting free variables for non-free variables in
all the related polynomials;
6 Perform the SOS programming on the positive semidefinite constraints
(16)–(18) and µ(x), η(x);
7 Check if a feasible solution is found, if not found, continue with a new loop;
else, check if the solution can indeed enable the corresponding polynomials to
be SOSs, if so, return ϕ(x); else, for all the polynomials in the programming,
eliminate all the monomials whose coefficients have too small absolute
values(usually less than 10−5) by using the same method as step 5, then go to
step 6 unless an empty polynomial is produced;
We use Algorithm 1 to compute the desired barrier certificate. In the algo-
rithm, we first choose a small set of negative values Λ as a candidate set for λ
and an integer interval [dMin, dMax] as a candidate set for degree d of ϕ(x).
Then, we attempt to find a barrier certificate satisfying the conditions (16)–(18)
for a fixed pair of λ and d until such one is found. Theoretically, according to
the analysis about the dependence of conservativeness of barrier certificate on
the value of λ, we should set λ to as small negative value as possible. How-
ever, experiments show that too small negative numbers for λ often lead the
semidefinite programming function to numerical problems. In practice, the neg-
ative values in the interval [−1, 0) are good enough for λ to verify very critical
safety properties. Note that the principle for step 3 in Algorithm 1 is that if
ϕ(x) has a dominating degree in both polynomials, there couldn’t exist a so-
lution that make both polynomials be SOS s because −ϕ(x) and ϕ(x) occur in
(16) and (18) simultaneously. The motive for eliminating the monomials with
small coefficients in step 7 is from the observation that those monomials are
usually the cause of the failed SOS decomposition for the polynomials when the
semidefinite programming function gives a seemingly feasible solution.
The idea for constructing barrier certificates for continuous systems can be
easily extended to hybrid systems. We describe it in the following subsection.
4.2 Sum-of-squares Transformation for Hybrid System
Similar to continuous system, in order to be solvable by semidefinite program-
ming, we need to limit the hybrid system model in Section 2 to semialgebraic
hybrid system.
Consider the hybrid system H = 〈L,X,E,R,G, I, F 〉, where the mappings
F,R,G, I of H are defined with respect to polynomial inequalities as follows:
– F : l 7→ fl(x)
– G : (l, l′) 7→ {x ∈ Rn|Gll′(x) ≥ 0, Gll′(x) ∈ R[x]pll′}
– R : (l, l′, x) 7→ {x′ ∈ Rn|Rll′x(x′) ≥ 0, Rll′x(x′) ∈ R[x]qll′}
– I : l 7→ {x ∈ Rn|Il(x) ≥ 0, Il(x) ∈ R[x]rl}
and the mappings of the initial set and the unsafe set are defined as follows:
– Init : l 7→ {x ∈ Rn| Initl(x) ≥ 0, Initl(x) ∈ R[x]sl}
– Unsafe : l 7→ {x ∈ Rn|Unsafel(x) ≥ 0,Unsafel(x) ∈ R[x]tl}
where pll′ , qll′ , rl, sl and tl is the dimension of polynomial vector space. Then
we have the following corollary for constructing barrier certificate for the semi-
algebraic hybrid system H.
Corollary 2. Let the hybrid system H and the initial state set mapping Init and
the unsafe state set mapping Unsafe be defined as the above. Then, for any given
set of constant real numbers Sλ = {λl ∈ R|l ∈ L} and any given set of constant
non-negative real numbers Sγ = {γll′ ∈ R+|(l, l′) ∈ E} ,and any given small real
number  > 0, if there exists a set of polynomial functions {ϕl(x) ∈ R[x]|l ∈ L}
and five sets of SOS polynomial vectors {µl(x) ∈ R[x]sl |l ∈ L}, {θl(x) ∈
R[x]rl |l ∈ L}, {κll′(x) ∈ R[x]pll′ |(l, l′) ∈ E} , {σll′(x) ∈ R[x]qll′ |(l, l′) ∈ E} and
{ηl(x) ∈ R[x]tl |l ∈ L}, such that the polynomials
ϕl(x)− µl(x) Initl(x) (19)
λlϕl(x)− Lflϕl(x)− θl(x)Il(x) (20)
γll′ϕl(x)− ϕl′(x′)− κll′(x)Gll′(x)− σll′(x′)Rll′x(x′) (21)
ϕl(x)− − ηl(x)Unsafel(x) (22)
are SOSs for all l ∈ L and (l, l′) ∈ E, then the safety property is satisfied by the
system H.
Proof. Similar to Corollary 1, it’s easy to prove that any set of polynomials
{ϕl(x)} satisfying (19)–(22) also satisfies (11)–(14), hence the hybrid system H
is safe. uunionsq
The algorithm for computing the barrier certificates for hybrid systems is
similar to the algorithm for continuous systems except that it needs to take into
account the constraint (21) for the discrete transitions. We do not elaborate on
it here any more. Note that the strategy for the selection of λ’s for continuous
system applies here as well and we only need to set all the elements of Sγ to
1 except for the discrete transition whose post-state is independent of the pre-
state, where we set γll′ to 0 to reduce the computational complexity.
5 Examples
5.1 Example 1
Consider the two-dimensional system (from [7] page 315)[
x˙1
x˙2
]
=
[
x2
−x1 + 13x31 − x2
]
with X = R2, we want to verify that starting from the initial set X0 = {x ∈
R2|(x1−1.5)2+x22 ≤ 0.25}, the system will never evolve into the unsafe set Xu =
{x ∈ R2|(x1+1)2+(x2+1)2 ≤ 0.16}. We attempted to use both the method based
on Convex Condition proposed in [14] and the method based on Exponential
Condition in this paper to find the barrier certificates with a degree ranging from
2 to 10. (Note that in [4], [22], the inductive invariants are not sufficient in general
according to [21] and hence cannot be applied to our examples. The work of [19]
applies only to a very special class of hybrid systems which is not applicable
to our examples either.) During this process, all the programming polynomials
are complete polynomials automatically generated (instead of the non-complete
polynomials consisting of painstakingly chosen terms) and all the computations
are performed in the same environment. The result of the experiment is listed in
Table 5.1. The first column is the degree of the barrier certificate to be found,
the second column is the amount of time spent by the method based on Convex
Condition, and the rest columns are the amount of time spent by the method
based on Exponential Condition for different value of λ. Note that the symbol
× in the table indicates that the method failed to find a barrier certificate with
the corresponding degree either because the semidefinite programming function
found no feasible solution or because it ran into a numerical problem.
As shown in Table 5.1, the method based on Convex Condition succeeded
only in one case (Degree = 4) due to the conservativeness of Convex Condition.
Comparably, our method found all the barrier certificates of the specified degrees
ranging from 2 to 10. Especially, the lowest degree of barrier certificate we found
is quadratic: ϕ(x) = −.86153− .87278x1−1.1358x2− .23944x21− .5866x1x2 with
µ(x) = 0.75965 and η(x) = 0.73845 when λ is set to −1. The phase portrait
of the system and the zero level set of ϕ(x) are shown in Fig. 3(a). Note that
being able to find a lower degree of barrier certificates is essential in reducing
the computational complexity.
Table 1. Computing results for Convex Condition and Exponential Condition. Expo-
nential Condition shows much stronger capability in finding barrier certificates.
Degree Convex Condition Exponential Condition
of
T ime(sec) T ime(sec)
ϕ(x) λ = −1
8
λ = −1
4
λ = −1
2 × 0.4867 0.4836 0.2496
3 × 0.5444 0.6224 0.4976
4 0.4368 0.4103 0.4072 0.3853
5 × 0.4321 0.4103 0.3947
6 × 0.3214 0.3011 0.2714
7 × 0.9563 0.9532 0.9453
8 × 0.9188 0.8970 0.7893
9 × 1.4944 1.4149 1.5132
10 × 1.4336 1.3931 1.3650
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Fig. 3. (a) Phase portrait of the system in Subsection 5.1. The solid patches from right
to left are X0 and Xu, respectively, the solid lines depict the boundary of the reachable
region of the system from X0, and the dashed lines are the zero level set of a quadratic
barrier certificate ϕ(x) which separates the unsafe region Xu from the reachable region.
(b) Discrete transition diagram of the hybrid system in Subsection 5.2.
In addition, we can see from Table 5.1 that the runtime of Exponential Con-
dition-based method decreases with the value of λ for each fixed degree except
for Degree = 3, 9, this observation can greatly evidence our theoretical result
about λ selection: the less, the better.
5.2 Example 2
In this example, we consider a hybrid system with two discrete locations (from [13]).
The discrete transition diagram of the system is shown in Fig. 3(b) and the vector
fields describing the continuous behaviors are as follows:
f1(x) =
 x2−x1 + x3
x1 + (2x2 + 3x3)(1 + x
2
3)
 , f2(x) =
 x2−x1 + x3
−x1 − 2x2 − 3x3

At the beginning, the system is initialized at some point in X0 = {x ∈ R3|x21 +
x22 + x
2
3 ≤ 0.01} and then it starts to evolve following the vector fields f1(x)
at location 1(NO CONTROL mode). When the system reaches some point in
the guard set G(1, 2) = {x ∈ R3|0.99 ≤ x21 + 0.01x22 + 0.01x33 ≤ 1.01}, it can
jump to location 2 (CONTROL mode) nondeterministically without performing
any reset operation (i.e., R(1, 2, x) = G(1, 2)). At location 2, the system will
operate following the vector field f2(x), which means that a controller will take
over to prevent x1 from getting too big. As the system enters the guard set
G(2, 1) = {x ∈ R3|0.03 ≤ x21 + x22 + x23 ≤ 0.05}, it will jump back to location
1 nondeterministically again without reset operation (i.e., R(2, 1, x) = G(2, 1)).
Different from the experiment in [13], where the objective is to verify that |x1| <
5.0 in CONTROL mode, our objective is to verify that x1 will stay in a much
more restrictive domain in CONTROL mode: |x1| < 3.2.
We define the unsafe set as Unsafe(1) = ∅ and Unsafe(2) = {x ∈ R3|3.2 ≤
|x1| ≤ 10}, which is sufficient to prove |x1| < 3.2 in CONTROL mode. Similarly,
we tried to use both the method in this paper and the method in [14] to compute
the barrier certificate. By setting λ1 = λ2 = − 15 and γ12 = γ21 = 1, our method
found a pair of quartic barrier certificate functions: φ1(x) and φ2(x), whose zero
level set is shown in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) respectively. As you can see, at
each location l = 1, 2, the zero level set of φl(x) forms the boundary of the
over-approximation φl(x) ≤ 0 (denoting the points within the pipe) for the
reachable set at location l. On the one hand, the hybrid system starts from
and evolves within the corresponding over-approximation and jumps back and
forth between the two over-approximations. On the other hand, the unsafe set
does not intersect the over-approximation formed by φ2(x) ≤ 0 (see Fig. 4(c)).
Therefore, the safety of the system is guaranteed. However, using the method
in [14], we cannot compute the barrier certificate, which means it cannot verify
the system.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new barrier certificate condition (called Exponential
Condition) for the safety verification of continuous systems and hybrid systems.
Our barrier certificate condition is parameterized by a real number λ and the
conservativeness of the barrier certificate condition depends closely on the value
of λ: the less value the λ is, the less conservative the barrier certificate condition
is. Specifically, Convex Condition is just the special case of Exponential Condi-
tion with λ = 0. Therefore, we can obtain the barrier certificate condition that
is less conservative than Convex Condition as long as we set λ to a negative
(a) φ1(x) = 0 (b) φ2(x) = 0 (c) 3.2 ≤ x1 ≤ 10, φ2(x) = 0
Fig. 4. Barrier certificates φ1(x) and φ2(x) for the hybrid system in Subsection 5.2.
φl(x) = 0 (l = 1, 2) forms the boundary of the over-approximation φl(x) ≤ 0 and
separates the inside reachable set from the outside unsafe set (e.g. 3.2 ≤ x1 ≤ 10).
value. The most important benefit of Exponential Condition is that it possesses
a relatively low conservativeness as well as the convexity and hence can be solved
efficiently by semidefinite programming method.
Based on our method, we are able to construct polynomial barrier certificate
to verify very critical safety property for semialgebraic continuous systems and
hybrid systems. The experiments on a continuous system and a hybrid system
show the effectiveness and practicality of our method.
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